Scanlon's book addresses fundamental issues of moral theory, and his discussions of welfarism and consequentialism are intricately woven into his treatments of these issues. On several of these large topics his insights are profound, so the reader might easily gain the impression that a strong momentum of argument against welfarist consequentialism is developing. Assessing the argument at each of its nested stages corrects this mistaken impression. Scanlon's arguments are indeed insightful but not in ways that should budge the consequentialist from her position.
consequentialists suppose is the case. Reasons often work to exclude classes of considerations from having any bearing on subsequent choices. Adopting something as a goal gives that thing a special weight and place in decision making; from then on the adopted goal does not just compete on equal terms with the myriad other things that might have been adopted as goals in determinations of what should be sought and promoted. As an example of a choice-framing and consideration-excluding reason, Scanlon cites the decision to play to win when one meets a friend for a tennis match. The thought that one should play to win screens off what might otherwise have been salient considerations in deciding how to play, such as the consideration that if the friend loses the match his feelings might be hurt. Practical reasoning does not then take the form of maximizing the production of best outcomes all things considered, and not all reasons take the form of considerations that affect the calculation of best outcomes. A reason is a different kind of animal from what the consequentialist takes it to be.
What Scanlon says about tennis playing and playing to win sounds right to me but has no tendency to impugn a sensible consequentialism. The key here is to keep straight the different levels of abstraction in describing the consequentialist approach to practical reasoning. As is well known, the consequentialist principle just states a criterion of right action, and is not per se a practical guide to decision making. Since human brains do not have limitless computing capacity, we could not at each moment of choice review all possible acts and all their possible outcomes and calculate what to do according to some maximizing function. Hence as a practical matter we need short cuts to decision making such as heuristics, rules, social norms, training and habit, and deference to established convention and authority. All of these props and guides to decision making are to be assessed according to their tendency to promote better decisions than alternative modes of decision. The decisive clue that these props and guides are tools to the promotion of best consequences is that in a case where one happens to come to know that ignoring the guidelines will lead to a better outcome in this case, the supposed reasons generated by the guidelines simply evaporate. In the tennis play example, deciding whether or not to play to win and abiding by the decision and ignoring counterconsiderations to some extent may be well and good for imperfect human reasoners. But if we imagine that one suddenly realizes that one's friend, huffing and wheezing, is in danger of physical collapse unless play is slowed down, or that one's friend is a far better competitor than one had thought and is toying with one's best efforts and rendering them merely ridiculous, so that carrying through on one's resolve to play to win has avoidably bad consequences, its status as a reason just dissolves without residue. This train of thought under inspection yields no argument against consequentialism.
STATES OF AFFAIRS
One strand in Scanlon's critique consists in observing that there are many kinds of reason and ways in which things are valuable and that consequentialism errs in suppressing this plurality and supposing that there is just one way in which something can be valuable: to be valuable is to be promoted. Examples of the plurality Scanlon discerns: wine is to be savored, persons are to be respected. To value human life is not necessarily to hold that one should produce more human lives.
Here the target of Scanlon's shots is a doctrine about the good that he calls "teleology." It is a building block in consequentialist theories of what is morally right.
Teleology holds that (1) "the primary bearers of value are states of affairs or, over time, ways the world might go," (2) states of affairs have intrinsic value, (3) so far as value is concerned, what we have reason to do is to bring about the states of affairs that are best, i.e., have the most intrinsic value. Following Elizabeth Anderson, Scanlon finds it erroneous to suppose that states of affairs or ways the world might be are the primary bearers of intrinsic value. 3 Anderson asserts that states of affairs are generally only extrinsically, not intrinsically valuable. The state of affairs in which a person enjoys good fortune is valuable only if the person is valuable. On this view, the teleologist misunderstands the nature of value, and the consequentialist builds a theory of right on this false foundation.
In response: it is not the case that the consequentialist must accept teleology as characterized by Scanlon. The consequentialist will hold that what we can bring about by our actions and omissions are states of affairs or ways the world might go. These are the objects of striving. The proper ultimate objects of striving are states of affairs that are desirable for their own sakes rather than just as means to further goals. But asserting this is fully compatible with holding states of affairs to be extrinsically or for that matter conditionally valuable. Nonteleological consequentialism will hold that the states of affairs to be promoted are those whose conditions of value are fulfilled. A story about intrinsic and extrinsic value must be told. But if teleology has defects, these are defects the consequentialist can avoid. person gains good fortune, achieves her rational ends, avoids suffering and pain, and so on will have more intrinsic value than corresponding states of affairs in which a monkey or a fish enjoys good fortune, achieves its ends, and gets pleasure rather than pain.
Corresponding to the claim in the one vocabulary that persons are intrinsically valuable will be a great many claims about the greater comparative intrinsic value of states of affairs involving persons than structurally similar states of affairs in which persons do not figure.
Moreover, the teleologist is not barred from recognizing whatever diversity and plurality values exhibit. If wine is to be savored and beer to be gulped, then properly appreciating the distinct kinds of value that inhere in wine drinking and beer drinking involves noting the differences. Being a good friend is not acting efficiently to promote a certain kind of desirable states of affairs. Rather being a good friend is being loyal to one's friend, acting for the good of the friend from concern for her, seeking out experiences in which the company of one's friend will provide mutual enjoyment. These reasons involved in being a good friend take priority over reasons to promote the occurrence of friendship, according to Scanlon.
He observes, "We would not say that it showed how much a person valued friendship if he betrayed one friend in order to bring it about that other people had more friends" (p.
89).
But if the state of affairs in which one person is a good friend to another is a persons, but the gain to others is marginal, and the cost to himself is great. Consider Terry, a housewife described in an essay by Jean Hampton, who insists on doing all the child care and house work while undergoing a difficult pregnancy that strains her health.
To save her husband and children minor inconvenience she causes serious damage to herself. 6 Surely the moral quality of the act from the agent's own perspective depends on Scanlon is correct to hold that in many contexts the important question for an agent deciding how to live is which plan of life she could follow would be most choiceworthy. Which life has the strongest weight of reasons behind it is the relevant question to ponder, not which life maximizes her own well-being. But it does not follow from this that well-being drops out as unimportant if, as I believe, which plan of life is most choiceworthy ultimately hinges on the expected well-being gains to self and others of each of the plans one might choose would attain.
Nor does the fact (if it be a fact) that well-being is an inclusive good tend to show that well-being has no important role to play in the choices of an individual. Each of the components of well-being, one's own and that of others, can be seen to be valuable in itself, not merely as contributing to well-being. But when one has to choose between different life plans one wants to know which plan gets more well-being for oneself and others. One needs to add up expected well-being gains to decide which life plan is more choiceworthy. For this one needs an account of well-being that permits such measurement. To be sure, in this domain one will surely at best find partial commensurability. Since one cannot attach precise numbers to candidate life plans corresponding to the level of expected well-being each one offers, one will find that many cannot be ranked: Plan A is neither nor better nor worse in its welfare prospects than plan B, nor are they tied. The appropriate response to the fact of partial commensurability on the part of a consequentialist is that since it exists, one must learn to live with it.
Scanlon is struck by the thought that the idea of welfare is a transparent container for aims that are choiceworthy in their own terms and are not valuable because their This is offered as an explication of the concept of moral wrongness; that an act is reasonably rejectable in this sense is the same thing as its being wrong. It also at is supposed to point us toward a conception of moral wrongness, a set of substantive judgments about the normative content of morality, that contrasts with consequentialist and contractarian (rule-egoist) and other approaches. A qualification is that Scanlon holds that his contractualism characterizes morality in the narrow sense, what we strictly owe each other. There is also a broader idea of morality that encompasses ideals that are not strictly required and also appropriate behavior toward nonrational animals and perhaps toward the natural world.
The bare statement of contractualism seems to me unobjectionable as a substantive judgment, whatever its merits as an analysis of the idea of what it is to be morally wrong. It is unobjectionable because purely formal and so far lacking in content.
What is not reasonably rejectable, I would say, is whatever there is most reason to accept.
The principles that determine what is right and wrong are those supported by the best reasons that bear on this topic. To this no one should object.
Scanlon immediately adds to this bare formulation a substantive and controversial gloss that might seem to rule out consequentialism from the outset, but is also somewhat vague and indeterminate as stated. The gloss is that the objections to a proposed principle that make it reasonably rejectable do not aggregate the losses or foregone gains that individuals would suffer if this principle rather than some other was adopted and followed. The objections that count are those made from the perspective of any individual who might be affected by its operation or better off if some other were adopted.
Before examining this antiaggregation proviso, let us note further features of Scanlon holds that candidate principles are to be assessed in terms of the reasons that individuals have, from the diverse standpoints defined by the principle, to accept or reject it. These reasons cannot be identified with the particular benefits and losses that will accrue to particular individuals. We cannot know these. Instead we must be concerned with generic reasons, the reasons that on the basis of our general understanding of human life we can impute to an individual in the situation picked out by the pertinent standpoint. Since one does not know exactly who will be affected by a principle that is chosen, one must balance reasons for and against by "relying on In theory the generic reasons for accepting a principle might be strong even though in every particular case to which the principle would apply, once one goes beyond generic considerations to consider all of the actual particular considerations that bear on the individuals affected by the principle, one sees that the particular considerations that reasonable agents would find salient would always lead them to find the principle in this application unacceptable. If we do not know the particular effects the operation of a principle would have on the people affected by it, it is reasonable to assess the principle according to considerations we impute to these affected individuals on the basis of our general knowledge of human affairs. But this sort of assessment would seem always to be provisional and liable to be overturned by the balance of particular considerations in particular circumstances of choice.
AGGREGATION
Promiscuous aggregation is thought to be the bane of consequentialism. As Joseph Raz observes, a hedonistic utilitarian is committed to the claim that an extra lick of ice cream supplied to a sufficiently large number of people outweighs the lost pleasure from killing an innocent person, so if one can only get the licks at the cost of the death, and there is no better option to choose, one ought to choose the option that kills for lots of trivial pleasure. 8 Any consequentialism that does not countenance strict lexical priority relations across distinct categories of goods will deliver a similar verdict.
Scanlon takes it to be a merit of contractualism that it does not countenance aggregation across persons. In deciding whether a proposed principle is reasonably According to Scanlon's idea of contractualist rejectability, one can have an objection against a proposed principle even if one has no complaint in the sense that one's well-being will suffer under it. Also, the Complaint Model tells us to abstract from all entitlements and rights in deciding whether a proposed principle is rejectable, but
Scanlon favors a holistic assessment according to which one can hold in place accepted rights and entitlements and consider the reasons for accepting and rejecting a principle with some moral matters being taken for granted.
Scanlon worries that contractualism might be (seen to be) excessively hostile to aggregation. Suppose that one is leading a rescue team in the wilderness, and must choose whether to save one or another group of people, the only relevant difference between the two groups being that one contains more people. Considering only individual objections to proposed principles taken one at a time, and refusing to aggregate objections, contractualism as stated seems unable to reject a principle that holds the rescue party should be free to choose one or the other of the groups. Presumably the same would be said if a pilot had to choose between crashing her plane where it would kill a greater or a smaller number of people. Here the constraint against aggregation binds too tightly.
Scanlon seeks an interpretation of his doctrine that delivers the verdict that the rescue team must save more rather than fewer lives but does not countenance aggregation across the board. He gives an example like Raz's that illustrates the latter danger: A television transmission of a World Cup soccer match must be interrupted for an hour in order promptly to rescue a technician who has been injured and "is receiving extremely painful electrical shocks" (p. 235). The example poses a choice of (1) small pleasures for many at the cost of torture for one or (2) the loss of the pleasures coupled with the elimination of the torture. In this sort of case Scanlon urges that the numbers do not matter and that the rescue should commence immediately no how many millions or billions of soccer fans are inconvenienced.
To complicate the picture, Scanlon introduces another type of case in which aggregation of benefits and losses across persons might, to the naïve, seem relevant to getting the right answer about what should be done. These are cases in which an activity is carried on in order to provide small or modest benefits for a great number of people but carrying on the activity involves imposing a risk of severe harm or death either on persons who are willingly participating in the activity or on nonparticipants. These cases are extremely common.
Scanlon appeals to the distinctions between doing and allowing and between intended and merely foreseen effects of what is done or allowed. This appeal allows him
to hold that it is reasonable to allow construction projects to go forward and other economic activities to be carried out even though they will predictably cause accidents that will injure some people and kill others even though it would not be reasonable to allow activities with similar benefits and costs but which involve deliberately intending to impose harm on some people by doing or allowing. In the case of activities that impose risks on others the question is what level of precaution should be required for those engaging in the activity. I do not see how one can determine the level of due care that must be sustained by an individual engaged in an activity that imposes risk of harm on others without taking into account the value of the activity that imposes the risks. Suppose we cannot carry on activity X except at a cost of two accidental deaths per year. Should we allow the activity to proceed? Surely this depends on how many people benefit from the activity and how much they benefit. In every such case we need to carry out a cost/benefit analysis with costs and benefits measured by the morally appropriate scale. What Scanlon deems acceptable intrapersonal comparison is not distinguishable in a principled way from straight interpersonal aggregation that he disparages. I shall return to this issue.
Setting to the side Scanlon's countenancing of intrapersonal but not interpersonal aggregation, one is left with several objections against consequentialist aggregation that are hard to assess.
For one thing, act-consequentialism holds that what one morally ought to do is always to do an act whose outcome is no worse than the outcome of any other act one could choose. The action one morally ought to do is the right action, and anything else one might do is morally wrong. But in this theory moral rightness and wrongness are thin notions. They do not directly correspond to moral rightness and wrongness in Scanlon's contractualist sense. Scanlon approvingly cites Mill's observation that we do not call anything wrong unless we believe the perpetrator ought to be punished in some way for doing it. 9 But the act-consequentialist notion does not connect to being fit for punishment in this way. What is wrong is anything other than what one morally ought to do, period. Nothing is asserted here about punishment, and to say that an act is fit for punishment is to say that punishing it would produce a better outcome than any other alternative response.
So it is fully consistent for an act-consequentialist to hold that if a friend can produce a best outcome by violating a duty of friendship, that is what she morally ought to do, even though disposing herself to be specially devoted to her friend in ways that predictably would lead her sometimes to perform wrong acts as in this case would have been productive of better outcomes on the whole than any alternative character-forming act. If duties or obligations imply that noncompliance merits punishment, a consequentialist account of obligation/duty may have it that the friend in the example is duty-bound to help her friend and should be punished in some way (by peer pressure or guilt feelings, say) if she does not.
Keeping in mind the discrepancy between the meaning of "morally wrong" in the mouth of the Scanlonian contractualist and in the mouth of the act-consequentialist, I find Scanlon's position of aggregation to be unsatisfactory or unstable for several reasons.
Although the consequentialist position per se does not rule out lexical priority rankings among goods and harms, I doubt such priority rankings can be sustained, so I doubt that Scanlon's position is rendered more acceptable by his embrace of them. The problem is one of continuity, illustrated by the Chain Argument posed by Alastair
Norcross. 10 Suppose we say that no amount of minor harm suffered by any number of people can outweigh a far more serious harm suffered by one individual. But one can describe a series of cases that challenge this claim. For one death, there will be some number of extremely severe harms just a bit less bad than death such that this number of extremely bad harms is overall morally worse than a single death. One then notices that there will be some number of very severe harms just a bit less bad than the extremely severe harm such that the number of very severe harms is overall worse than a single instance of extremely severe harm, and so on down to minor harm or slight inconvenience. But then one can zip back from the end of the chain of comparisons to the beginning. If a single death can be counterbalanced by some large number of slightly less severe harms, and these in turn can be counterbalanced by some very large number of lesser harms, and so on, then there is no plausible way that Scanlon can claim that the lesser harms suffered by TV viewers whose viewing would be interrupted cannot in principle morally outweigh the very severe harm of an hour's torture suffered by the worker in the TV station whose rescue now would interrupt the TV transmission. It all depends on the numbers after all.
This denial of Scanlonian antiaggregation is a mild claim. The denier might hold that in cases like the TV rescue case one ought morally to act immediately to relieve the pain of the suffering repairmen unless the utility he loses by delay of rescue is offset by a gain of M times that amount of utility that will accrue to others in total if rescue is delayed, with M being an extremely large number.
Scanlon has an interesting response to this line of objection. 11 He suggests that aggregation should perhaps stop short at the boundary of relevant harms. What he means is that a severe injury is comparable to the greater injury of a sudden death, so that one person's suffering sudden death might appropriately be counterbalanced by prevention of many persons suffering a lesser but comparable and hence relevant severe injury in a determination of what principles are reasonably rejectable on contractualist grounds. But slight convenience or enjoyment is such a slight benefit by comparison with suffering sudden death that the former is not even relevant to the determination of what qualifies as a reasonable principle that countenances the latter. In other words, whereas a reasonable principle might trade off death for severe head trauma, it would never countenance a trade of death for episodes of mere amusement or mild headache. Mutatis mutandis, the same goes for benefits.
This proposal is arithmetically puzzling. Scanlon might be saying that one sudden death can be offset by many incidents of onset of blindness (a relevant harm) but not by any number of episodes of mild headache (an irrelevant harm). But by parity of reasoning one incident of onset of blindness can be offset by many incidents of just-lesser harms, and so on, down through episodes of (say) mild headache. These will all be relevant harms. But then we reach the lower limit of relevance for onsets of blindness, so no number of episodes of extremely mild headache can offset a given number of episodes of mild headache. If we begin by focusing on the harm of sudden death, comparison gives out at one point, and if we begin by focusing on some lesser harm, comparison gives out at a different point. We end us saying in one breath that no number of mild headaches can offset a single instance of severe migraine and in another breath that some number of mild headaches can offset a single severe migraine. This won't do.
Another possibility Scanlon might have in mind is that there is some single boundary, such that harms above the boundary are comparable with each other and harms below the boundary are comparable with each other but no comparison and aggregation of harms across the boundary are possible. That is to say, a single instance of any abovethe-line harm outweighs any magnitude or aggregate of below-the line harms. But I cannot conceive of any remotely plausible location for this aggregation-limiting boundary. The plain and simple fact is that there is a continuum between the most horrendous harms and the mildest discomfort. For any harm one can conceive, one can conceive ever so slightly better and worse variants of the harm, and ever so slightly better and worse variants of those variants, and so on. The prospect that moral judgment can sensibly impose discontinuity on this smooth range of possibilities is bleak.
Still another possibility is that for any kind of harm, the total disvalue of any number of episodes in which this harm is suffered is bounded. If one death has a disvalue of -100, and the total disvalue of any number of incidents of arthritis cramp of a given magnitude is -99, then of course it will not be acceptable to countenance a single avoidable death in order bring about the prevention of any number of such arthritis cramps. But the idea that the disvalue of a given pain can vary depending on how many similar such episodes of pain exist somewhere in the universe is bizarre, and surely more implausible than implication of the straight aggregation that Scanlon seeks to reject.
Of course the defender of Scanlon's stance against aggregation can make further moves. One might reject transitivity here, and hold that A can be all things considered morally better than B, B better than C, and C better than A. 12 One might urge that the Chain Argument is best interpreted as a Sorites Paradox, and hence is amenable to one or another solution to such paradoxes. On this view, just as the fact that one hair more or less does not make the difference between hairiness and baldness should not compel us to assert that a series of small transitions in which one hair is removed can never produce baldness, in the same way the fact that for any harm of any magnitude there is some harm close to it and fungible with it should not compel us to assert that a series of transitions between harms of decreasing magnitude cannot bring us to a harm that is not fungible with the severe harm at the beginning of the chain of comparisons.
These are desperate expedients. Giving up the idea that morally better than is a transitive relation is more counterintuitive than agreeing that a large enough number of small harms can morally outweigh a single severe harm. The Sorites Paradox cases have their source in the vagueness of terms like "heap" and "bald" and this vagueness does not seem to attach to the idea of "morally better than." At any rate, the ideas that a structural feature of contractualism rules out aggregation altogether and that this feature of contractualism is morally attractive bump against the considerations I have been urging.
The implausibility of Scanlon's stand against interpersonal aggregation becomes evident when we reflect that a plausible deontology will countenance interpersonal aggregation just as consequentialism does. A deontological doctrine might either assert absolute or nonabsolute constraints. An absolute constraint asserts that acts that fall under certain descriptions must never be done whatever the consequences. A nonabsolute constraint asserts we have a duty to refrain from the acts that violate deontological rules, but this duty may be overriddden if the consequences of conforming to it in a given case are excessively bad.
A deontology of absolute constraints will only be coherent if the duties we are constrained always to fulfill can never conflict and yield contradictory imperatives. But even if a deontology of absolute constraints should prove to be coherent, it is hard to accept. As we imagine the consequences of conforming to some deontological constraint becoming more and more horrendous, at some point surely there is a threshold of badness such that any proposed deontological rule, however sacred, should be violated if this threshold of unacceptable consequences reached.
In gauging the threshold at which any particular deontological constraint is deemed to give way, any and all consequences that matter morally should be counted.
These will include benefits and losses to human persons and other animals. Since different sets of evils could all equally meet the threshold, we need a way of attaching weights to bads of different sorts so that they can be summed. By the Norcross argument we have already endorsed, benefits and harms should be aggregated across persons. If X number of painful and prolonged deaths of persons crosses the threshold, then some large number of any lesser harms suffered by many different persons will also cross the threshold.
Scanlon is quite correct to note that any form of consequentialism will have jarring and unsettling implications when harms are aggregated across persons. If a barely discernible slightly uncomfortable feeling experienced when one sits on a chair counts as a very small harm, then a large enough number of such harms outweighs a death. Hence according to consequentialism, other things being equal, one morally ought to bring about the death in order to avoid the many incidents of chair-sitting discomfort if one must accept one or the other of these bad outcomes.
The trick is to elaborate a position on aggregation that makes sense and continues to appear plausible when it is applied to a wide range of possible cases and when one attempts to fit it into a general view that withstands critical scrutiny. Scanlon's rejection of interpersonal aggregation across the board does not pass this test. The proposed cure is worse than the disease.
Scanlon uses "aggregation" with a narrower sense than I have been employing so far. According to Scanlon, an aggregative principle holds that "the sum of a certain sort of value is to be maximized" (p. 232). A nonabsolute deontology is obviously not aggregative in this sense. Nor for that matter are forms of consequentialism that assert that we ought to maximize some function of value other than straight summation. For example, a consequentialist principle might instruct us to maximize a function that favors equality in the distribution of value across persons as well as a greater aggregate sum of value. Another family of possibilities is given by prioritarian consequentialism, which assigns greater moral value to bringing about a benefit for an individual, the more badly off the person would be absent this benefit. In a footnote Scanlon indicates he finds these versions of consequentialism to be unacceptable, but he does not explore the issue in his text.
One can reject additive aggregation--the sum of a certain sort of value is to be maximized--and still be a consequentialist. Scanlon as we have seen also rejects aggregation in a broader sense. Broad aggregation holds that any single harm to an individual of any finite magnitude can be morally offset by some (perhaps very large) number of harms to individuals of any lesser magnitude, so that it is morally acceptable to impose the single big harm in order to prevent the great number of small harms. Of course, as noted, one could reject broad aggregation and still be a consequentialist. So even if Scanlon's attack on broad aggregation were successful, it would not advance our understanding of contractualism versus consequentialism.
But taken by itself, Scanlon's rejection of broad aggregation is dubious. Once one notices the wide variety of moral perspectives that accept broad aggregation, one then ultrahazardous activities to pay all costs of accidents that result from engaging in the activity regardless of whether the accident-generating activity is carried out in a negligent manner or not. Scanlon suggests that in such cases we can imagine the costs and benefits, measured in generic terms, that will accrue to an individual over the course of her life, and balance the gains to security (from knowing that she will get the aid or the compensation if she needs it) versus the loss of freedom (knowing that one must give aid or compensate in specified circumstances). Contractualism encompasses intrapersonal not interpersonal aggregation. The hope then is that this line coincides with the line between morally acceptable and unacceptable aggregation.
This maneuver does not succeed. Any principle that yields the result that in some circumstances some people should be made to suffer losses for the benefit of others can be represented more abstractly as a principle according to which any individual would gain the benefit if he happened to be in the beneficiary role and would pay the cost if he happened to be in the role of the one from whom sacrifice is exacted. Even a caste principle that says that lords should get cake and peasants should get bread can be represented from the ex ante perspective of a newborn child who could be either a lord or a serf, and would get the payoff of cake in the one case and bread in the other. Hence any principle that countenances interpersonal aggregation to determine what is morally right can be interpreted from some ex ante perspective as a principle that countenances intrapersonal aggregation only. The line that Scanlon wants to draw is not going to divide aggregation he wishes to regard as acceptable from the kind he wishes to reject.
In this section I have argued against Scanlon's account of contractualism's principled resistance to aggregation of harms and benefits to determine morally right action. I have claimed that Scanlon definitely goes wrong in seeking to defend a kind of moral absolutism, according to which some impositions of severe harms on individuals cannot be justified by small benefits to others no matter how numerous these others. I have also urged that Scanlon's various attempts to soften the hard edge of contractualist antiaggregation by allowing aggregation when that seems intuitively plausible reveal themselves to be unprincipled and arbitrary under examination.
CONCLUSION
My emphasis on Scanlon's views on aggregation might seem misplaced in view of the fact that I am defending welfarist consequentialism and this position is not necessarily opposed to Scanlon's antiaggregation doctrine. Moreover, the contractualist framework seems to be doing no work in leading Scanlon to the particular position on aggregation he accepts. He could cheerfully give up his antiaggregation doctrine while remaining a contractualist.
The moral I tentatively draw is that the contractualism versus consequentialism discussion in which Scanlon sometimes appears to be engaged diverts attention from his book's actual contributions. The fact that contractualism is an idle wheel in the derivation of his antiaggregation doctrine despite his insistence that contractualism nicely delivers this result is an indication that contractualist metaethics per se does not have normative implications. Scanlon's view is a way of thinking about morality not a set of moral claims and hence is not a theoretical source of opposition to welfarist consequentialism or for that matter to any other ethical position. 4 . This argument for teleology might be thought too glib. Suppose that the norms of friendship as ordinarily understood include deontological constraints: a good friend does not behave paternalistically toward her friend, does not form adverse judgment on her friend in the absence of decisive evidence for it and does not seek out such evidence unless moral considerations decisively compel the seeking, avoids lying to her friend and inclines toward candor, and so on. The good friend has reason to abide by these constraints, but the reason does not involve any goal to be achieved by her action. Moreover, in abiding by the constraint the good friend is motivated by loyalty to the friend, not by the thought of some further state of affairs to be promoted. So goes the objection against teleology based on the idea of friendship. My response is that teleology can go indirect. If friendship including its quasideontological norms is valuable, one has reason to develop friendship and be a good friend according to those norms and to be appropriately motivated in action by them. The good state of affairs thereby achieved is instantiation of good friendship. I should also note the possibility that the consequentialist might not seek to accommodate the ordinary ideal of friendship but might propose a revisionary model of friendship to facilitate a smoother mesh of friendship norms and consequentialist moral requirements. 
